It’s a nice case. Here are my thoughts:
For safety’s sake, multisigs should complete the rotation of affected signers before EIP-8151 is activated, or more strictly, before any signer EOA gains the ability to convert to pure code-controlled authorization, for account migration consistency.
From another perspective, losing access after multiple signer EOAs are compromised is a downstream consequence of those compromised accounts, not a reason for ecRecover to preserve their authority.
Most multisigs support upgrades: they can add a fallback path that uses a self-implemented recovery method when ecRecover returns zero. But there is an irreducible edge case: if a PQ attacker compromises enough signer keys to satisfy the threshold, the funds may either be stolen or deliberately locked. EIP-8151 cannot resolve a wallet whose authorization threshold has already been compromised.
| # | Наименование новости | Тональность | Информативность | Дата публикации |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | EIP-8151: Account Code Restricted ecRecover | 0 | 5.6 | 28-07-2026 |
| 2 | ERC-8335: Account-Level Transfer With Authorization | 0 | 7 | 10-07-2026 |
| 3 | ERC-8348: Financial Lease | 0 | 8.24 | 28-07-2026 |
| 4 | EIP-8037: State Creation Gas Cost Increase | 0 | 19.67 | 28-07-2026 |
| 5 | EIP-7906: Transaction Assertions via State Diff Opcode | 0 | 3 | 08-07-2026 |
| 6 | ERC-8339: Two-Phase Asset Transfers | 0 | 17.98 | 27-07-2026 |
| 7 | Add ERC 8217: Agent NFT Identity Bindings | 7 | 8 | 08-07-2026 |
| 8 | ERC-8006: Universal Policy Engine (programmable compliance) | 0 | 11.91 | 27-07-2026 |
| 9 | ERC-8183: Agentic Commerce | 0 | 5.48 | 28-07-2026 |
| 10 | Sicherheitsupdate n8n: Accountübernahme und Sandboxausbruch möglich | 0 | 13.13 | 24-07-2026 |