Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto at the Istana Merdeka, the Presidential Palace, in Jakarta (file photo) | Photo Credit: ANI

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s just-concluded visits to Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand mark the transitioning of India’s “Look East” stance into a more muscular “Act East” policy that deploys bilateral partnerships to extend New Delhi’s maritime and defence footprint across the South China Sea and the wider Indo-Pacific.

Of particular importance is Indonesia ’s wholehearted support to India’s participation in the integrated development of Sabang Port. Sabang lies just 160 kilometres (100 nautical miles) from India’s upcoming Great Nicobar trans-shipment port project, overlooking the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. For China, it is a vital economic lifeline for its trade and energy supplies. India’s maritime cooperation bid was reinforced by deepening of defence ties, with Indonesia signing an agreement to purchase BrahMos supersonic missiles and Astra beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles. Together, these initiatives signal a relationship that has moved decisively beyond commerce.

Equally critical was the emphasis on adherence to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, freedom of navigation and a rules-based Indo-Pacific. These are diplomatic formulations, but they unmistakably respond to China’s aggressive maritime posturing in the South China Sea while steadily expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean. India is responding firmly to Beijing’s growing influence through its “string of pearls” i.e. the network of port investments stretching across Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Maldives. PM Modi’s Indonesian sojourn marks a continuum with earlier engagements with countries like Seychelles. India is steadily deepening its defence and maritime partnerships with key Indo-Pacific countries — from Vietnam and Indonesia in South-East Asia to Japan and Australia in the Pacific — to extend its strategic presence directly into China’s maritime periphery. Australia completes this strategic geometry. The new defence and security declaration goes well beyond symbolism. Twelve years after the two countries inked a civil nuclear cooperation pact, Modi’s visit to the country paved the way for commercial uranium supplies to fuel India’s expanding nuclear power programme. Alongside closer coordination through the Quad, the relationship reflects New Delhi’s growing view of the Indo-Pacific as a single maritime theatre rather than two separate oceans.

None of this amounts to an overt policy of containment. India has carefully avoided joining military alliances or framing its diplomacy as explicitly anti-China. Yet, the drift is unmistakable. By weaving together bilateral partnerships with Indonesia, Australia and island nations in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi is building a network of like-minded maritime partners. China will inevitably read these moves as an attempt to balance its influence. India would describe them differently: as an effort to preserve a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific.

Published on July 13, 2026