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СпутникиРНSpaceXРоскосмосNASAIf current trends continue, the PLAAF is likely going to have a greater-than-usual presence on the next Central Military Commission.
Amid leadership disruption caused by the purges, the reconstruction of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) high command is underway. Recent reports by the South China Morning Post and Channel News Asia indicate that officers from the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) have recently risen to senior leadership positions, prompting renewed discussions on the significance of this development.
At present, PLAAF officers are in charge of five Central Military Commission (CMC) departments, compared with seven headed by Army officers, making the PLAAF the second-best-represented service at the CMC level. Moreover, of the PLA’s five theater commands, PLAAF officers lead two: the Eastern and Central Theater Commands. Meanwhile, an Army lieutenant general heads the Northern Theater Command, while a Navy vice admiral leads the Southern Theater Command. The situation within the Western Theater Command is murkier. Its commander, an Army general, has been missing for many months and his PLAAF deputy appears to have taken up some of his responsibilities.
Overall, the expanding PLAAF presence at the top of the PLA hierarchy is obvious. If current trends continue, the PLAAF is likely going to have a greater-than-usual presence on the next CMC, whose composition is expected to be confirmed at the 21st Party Congress in 2027. This development has the potential to reshape the PLA in multiple ways, rendering an analysis of the PLAAF’s rise and its wider implications worthy.
The PLAAF’s representation on the CMC has historically been limited. In the Xi Jinping era, only two PLAAF officers served as CMC members: PLAAF Commander Ma Xiaotian from 2012 to 2017, and Air Force General Xu Qiliang as the CMC vice chairman from 2012 to 2022. Only one PLAAF officer served as the director of a CMC department: Air Force General Xu Xueqiang, who led the Equipment Development Department from 2022 until 2026.
However, the limited representation may have been a blessing in disguise. As officers from other services rose to prominence, many quickly became targets of the expanding purges. With few senior leaders at high posts, the PLAAF was less exposed to the turbulence. From 2013 to 2026, there were only ten documented cases of senior PLAAF officers falling victim to the purges, with the most recent cases being the aforementioned Xu Xueqiang and the PLAAF’s 14th Political Commissar Guo Puxiao.
The survival of PLAAF officers provided Xi with a larger pool of candidates to draw upon as he seeks to rebuild the PLA’s senior leadership. Also, PLAAF officers’ ability to survive constant Discipline Inspection Commission surveillance may have strengthened Xi’s confidence in their reliability. The rise of PLAAF officers is therefore natural in a time of leadership reconstruction amid elevating global tensions, creating a situation where military talents are desperately needed.
The rise of PLAAF officers to senior leadership posts could influence future PLA development in several ways. As PLAAF officers gain more say, they are likely to advocate for their service and specialties. At CMC meetings, they are certain to promote the importance of air power, which has proved to be critical in recent conflicts. At the beginning of the Iran War, U.S. and Israeli air superiority enabled the decapitation of Iran’s civilian and military leadership. However, vulnerabilities in U.S. and Gulf states’ air defenses subsequently shifted the initiative and drained U.S. stocks of critical interceptors. The conflict highlighted the need to invest resources to improve offensive and defensive capabilities in the air domain.
PLAAF officers could cite these examples to advocate for more investment in air defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, counter-drone technologies, air base protection, and munitions production. Such investments could benefit the PLA, since China’s next war will likely require extensive air force participation. The recent revelation of the air-launched, nuclear-capable JL-1 missile on board the H-6N bomber may reflect China’s intent to strengthen and expand its air force capabilities.
A stronger emphasis on air power will divert more resources to the PLAAF. Yet, an unintended consequence might be resource competition with the traditionally powerful Army, whose personnel constitute nearly half of the PLA and occupy a majority of senior leadership posts. Xi cannot afford to alienate the Army, which remains the bedrock of the armed forces and essential to regime security. Looking ahead, Xi is likely to use his personal authority as CMC chairman to mitigate possible tensions between the ascendant airmen and still-dominant army officers, with the ultimate goal being achieving greater jointness across the services.
As Xi constructs a new generation of PLA leaders, he seems to favor a team with a significant number of PLAAF officers. This development could benefit PLA capabilities by giving more institutional weight to air power, when its relevance to military success has been made evident through recent conflicts. Nonetheless, one should expect politics to overshadow officer selection and promotion, as this has always been the case with the PLA.
In the Xi era, the PLA has experienced considerable instability due to the anti-corruption campaign. There is no guarantee that the now favored PLAAF officers will not fall prey to the rolling purges, despite their previous experience as the least affected service. Ultimately, the past has shown that the higher PLA officers move up in the chain of command, the greater scrutiny they face, as they become enmeshed in an environment of mistrust. In essence, one must not disregard the influence of politics when analyzing the trajectory of PLA developments.
There may be a short period of unity among senior PLA leaders after the 21st Party Congress. However, if recurring dynamics of the Xi era endure, instability could reemerge once again to disrupt PLA capability, even undermining the careers of PLAAF officers who are currently on the ascent.
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