On June 9, a Supreme Court division Bench observed that the court cannot remain a mute spectator in matters concerning animals, noting that their wellbeing is of paramount importance. The court’s observation in this case (Jayakrishna Menon vs. Krishnankutty & Ors) arose from an ownership dispute over Raman, Keralam’s tallest elephant, who was being used for temple activities. Raman’s temporary custodian was responsible for care and upkeep but the elephant continued to be used for temple activities despite it being prohibited by the top court. The Supreme Court ordered the Keralam government to take custody of Raman, emphasising that it would fail in its duty towards “voiceless animals” if it turned a blind eye to such defiance of court orders.

The court’s observation implicitly acknowledges an animal’s propensity to suffer while highlighting the need to ensure the wellbeing of animals. However, the approach adopted by the SC in this case stands in sharp contrast to its ruling on the issue of street dogs in Re: City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price, 2026, where a three-judge Bench adopted a much narrower interpretation of the law which led to the removal of a large numbers of dogs from public institutions.

The judiciary’s differential treatment of these two categories of animals — elephants and street dogs — raises important moral and legal questions. For instance, why is one elephant’s wellbeing of “paramount importance”, while the welfare of lakhs of street dogs is disregarded? Further, how is it that the same institution adopts two contrasting (if not contradictory) approaches to decide issues involving similar moral considerations? And importantly, is the judiciary the best positioned institution to decide cases that seal the fate of animals (for better or for worse)?

However, one needs to acknowledge that these two cases and the animals at the centre of them are not identical. The legal protections these two animals are entitled to, and their interactions with humans vary significantly. The Indian elephant is a charismatic animal, listed as an Endangered Species on the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s Red List, and is explicitly protected under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. The street dog, on the other hand, is legally perceived as a problem that needs to be tackled. One is expected to live in the wild (away from human habitation) while the other shares our public spaces, requiring us to learn to coexist in shared spaces. 

While it is important to recognise these differences, it is also crucial to question whether they are significant enough to attract completely different moral and legal considerations.

As moral philosopher Peter Singer has argued, the basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration. For Singer, equal consideration is extended to every being that has interests, has some subjective awareness, or is capable of feeling pleasure or pain. Singer accepts that equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights. However, when comparing the two judgments in question, it is the absence of equal consideration itself that seems to be leading to the differential treatment. Equal consideration, in both these cases, would require an assessment of the needs of the animals, and then the determining of a relevant course of action.

There is also a similarity in the approach of the laws that govern these animals. The Wildlife Protection Act for elephants, and the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 that apply to street dogs reveal an anthropocentric bias in evaluating the worth of animals, which in turn determines the nature and level of protections they are entitled to.

Two different cases involving different animals presented contrasting approaches to the treatment of animals by the SC. This highlights a gap in legislative guidance for ensuring the well-being of animals, different as they may be in their categorisation in the eyes of the law. The Swiss Constitution, for example, not only ensures the well-being of animals but also ensures the protection of animal dignity which grants animals an inherent worth. This responsibility ultimately lies with the Parliament which should extend protection to every being worthy of moral consideration. We need a strong legislative foundation which provides moral consideration to all animals and enables pathways for ethical coexistence.

Apoorva, Shubham Dhamelia, and Shreeja S. work at the Animal Law & Policy Network (ALPN Research Foundation)