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СпутникиРНSpaceXРоскосмосNASAOrganized crime groups with roots in Taiwan have become a useful tool for the CCP – in Taiwan and, increasingly, abroad.
In early May, Japanese writer Yasuda Minetoshi published a feature article in NEWS Post Seven examining how the Chinese Communist Party may be using organized crime networks to penetrate Okinawa. According to the report, Beijing has in recent years intensified efforts to shape political narratives on the island. Beyond the visible promotion of the “Ryukyu independence movement,” the report also alleged that groups originating in Taiwan’s underworld have been used as channels for influence operations.
These groups are not merely criminal organizations. Some are reportedly linked to long-standing Chinese secret societies with transnational networks. Through such channels, China’s influence activities are alleged to have reached not only Japan, but also parts of Latin America. The central question is therefore not simply whether these groups are criminal actors, but why their historical background and organizational networks make them useful to Beijing’s broader external strategy.
Chinese Secret Societies and the Ryukyu Independence Narrative
In Yasuda’s report, one organization occupies a particularly important position: the Bamboo Union, one of Taiwan’s most prominent organized crime groups. Its spiritual leader, Chang An-lo, has long been linked in public accounts to Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) intelligence networks during the period of martial law. In particular, he was associated with the assassination of Henry Liu, also known by his pen name Chiang Nan, a journalist and KMT critic who was then living in the United States. Chang later spent years in China.
To understand why such a figure matters in the Okinawa context, however, it is necessary to examine a much older organization: the Hongmen.
According to historical legend, the Hongmen traces its origins to the Tiandihui, a secret society said to have been established by Chen Yonghua, prime minister of the Taiwan-based Kingdom of Tungning and a figure associated with anti-Qing resistance. The Tiandihui was reportedly involved in intelligence gathering and guerrilla activities behind Qing lines.
Although the Kingdom of Tungning eventually collapsed, the Tiandihui tradition later became associated with the Hongmen, which continued to play a role in anti-Qing mobilization. In later periods, Hongmen networks were also linked to revolutionary movements that helped bring down the Qing Empire. Sun Yat-sen, later remembered as the founding father of the Republic of China, was among the revolutionary figures associated with the Hongmen tradition.
After the collapse of the Qing Empire, Sun Yat-sen sought external support in the fragmented political environment of the warlord era and chose to cooperate with Soviet communist forces. This political alignment also helped bring some members of secret-society networks into contact with the early Chinese Communist movement. The cooperation between the KMT and the Soviet-backed communists continued until Sun’s death and ended after Chiang Kai-shek, the right-wing KMT leader who succeeded him, launched a purge against communist elements within the party.
Following Chiang’s purge, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continued to cultivate remaining Hongmen members and other local armed or underworld actors willing to cooperate with it. These networks may have helped the CCP survive military pressure, navigate the Japanese invasion, and later gain advantages during the Chinese Civil War. Hongmen elders were reportedly present as honored guests at the founding ceremony of the People’s Republic of China and later participated in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
Seen from this perspective, the CCP did not simply emerge in isolation as an ideological party; it also benefited from contacts with secret-society and underworld networks. After taking power, however, it increasingly sought to absorb, discipline, or repurpose those networks for its own political needs.
What, then, is the relationship among the Bamboo Union, the Hongmen, and the Chinese Unification Promotion Party, the political party founded by Chang An-lo? In the narrative presented by several reports, the Bamboo Union was historically connected to Taiwan’s KMT intelligence circles, while Chang became one of its most influential figures. Some accounts also suggest that members linked to Hongmen networks were involved in these circles.
Chang later founded the Chinese Unification Promotion Party, which has been widely viewed in Taiwan as a pro-Beijing political organization. In recent years, as Beijing has sought to weaken the strategic constraints imposed by the First Island Chain, Chang and related networks have reportedly become involved in contacts with organized crime groups in Okinawa. The Kyokuryu-kai appears to be one of the key groups mentioned in this context.
Taiwan’s Mirror Media has further reported that Chinese intelligence-linked actors used Chang to cultivate contacts within the Kyokuryu-kai and encourage some of its members to join Hongmen-related organizations. The same reporting also alleged that Kyokuryu-kai-linked channels were used to support groups advocating Ryukyu independence.
At present, one of the most notable links is that Uejo Keizo, the leader of “Huashongshan,” described as a Hongmen branch in Okinawa, is also said to hold a position in the Nanshu Ikka, a group under the Kyokuryu-kai. Although the Nanshu Ikka may not itself hold an explicit political agenda, its reported connections illustrate how local criminal networks can become entangled in broader political influence operations.
China’s Infiltration Operations Abroad
The relationship between the CCP and the Hongmen should not be understood as a simple matter of direct organizational control. Rather, after the CCP established its regime, it appears to have sought influence over parts of the Hongmen and other overseas Chinese networks, using them as possible channels for intelligence gathering, mobilization, and political influence. Some Hongmen members who recognized the CCP’s intentions reportedly chose to distance themselves from older Hongmen structures and establish new organizations.
Nevertheless, these efforts at separation did not eliminate Beijing’s ability to influence or exploit parts of Hongmen-linked networks. Hong Kong’s 14K and other triad groups have often been described as having historical connections to Hongmen traditions. In recent years, some of these networks have also been mentioned in discussions of fentanyl trafficking to the United States. During a 2023 U.S. congressional hearing, Representative Lisa McClain, then chair of the House Oversight Committee’s Subcommittee on Health Care and Financial Services, called for further investigation into the relationship between Chinese criminal networks and the Communist Party. The purpose was to identify how Chinese criminal groups may be involved in drug smuggling, money laundering, political influence, and the expansion of Beijing’s overseas power. Ray Donovan, former chief of operations at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, also suggested that such trafficking networks may involve not only criminal groups, but also Chinese officials and state-owned enterprises.
Beyond drug trafficking, Hongmen-linked or Chinese underworld networks have also been discussed in connection with political infiltration and disruption. In her study “Underground Front,” Hong Kong scholar Christine Loh argued that the large-scale riots in Hong Kong in 1967 were planned and encouraged by CCP intelligence organs. According to this account, Beijing used propaganda outlets such as Xinhua while also mobilizing Chinese underworld groups, including triads and 14K-linked actors, to organize street violence. The alleged purpose was to create sufficient disorder to justify possible intervention by the People’s Liberation Army and the expulsion of British influence from Hong Kong. That plan ultimately failed after the British colonial government imposed a forceful crackdown.
Why would gangs and secret societies cooperate with the Communist Party? Historical ties and personal networks are part of the answer, but political protection may be another. A former Chinese minister of public security once remarked in an interview that “the underworld is patriotic, too.” The statement has often been interpreted as reflecting the CCP’s willingness to treat Chinese criminal networks as useful assets, provided that they remain politically obedient and serve the Party’s interests.
This approach can attract groups that were not originally under CCP direction. The Bamboo Union, for example, was historically closer to KMT-linked networks, but some figures associated with it later moved into pro-Beijing political circles. Rather than describing this as formal incorporation into the CCP, it may be more accurate to say that certain underworld-linked actors came to cooperate with Beijing’s overseas political agenda. Such cooperation can include intelligence collection, influence work, illicit commerce, and the cultivation of other local criminal networks. These activities pose serious risks to public security, social stability, and local economies in the countries where they take place.
How Democracies Should Respond
How should states respond to this kind of infiltration? The broader pattern suggests that Beijing’s historical connections with secret societies and Chinese underworld networks have produced a complex web of personal relationships, political loyalties, and informal channels. Because these organizations often operate as closed secret societies, much of the relevant information is difficult to obtain through public databases. Japan has the Anti-Boryokudan Law, which seeks to restrict gang financing and identify members of organized crime groups. Yet Beijing’s use of secret societies, civic associations, cultural groups, and other informal networks can make legal scrutiny more difficult.
To expose these networks, governments need more than formal legal tools. They also require investigators and analysts who understand how Hongmen-linked organizations operate, how underworld networks communicate, and how political influence can be embedded in ostensibly nonpolitical associations. Cooperation with U.S. and Taiwanese intelligence agencies would also be essential, particularly because the networks in question often cross borders and operate through multiple jurisdictions.
More fundamentally, democracies must recognize that Beijing often exploits the openness of democratic societies to weaken democratic resilience from within. No single country can fully address this challenge alone. Reducing the risks of infiltration will require coordinated intelligence sharing, stronger financial monitoring, closer scrutiny of foreign-linked associations, and sustained cooperation among democratic partners.
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