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СпутникиРНSpaceXРоскосмосNASAFor over 30 years, the Philippines has tried – and struggled – to bolster its defense capabilities. What went wrong?
For decades, the Philippines was disincentivized from spending adequately on its external defense capabilities. Immediately after its independence, the country was beset with internal security problems ranging from communist rebels to Muslim secessionists, forcing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to allocate its scarce resources on counterinsurgency. Moreover, the security umbrella that the United States directly provided through its bases in the Philippines further discouraged spending for territorial defense.
The rug was finally pulled out from under the Philippines in 1995, when China seized Mischief Reef and Manila could offer no meaningful resistance. This led to the hasty signing of the first AFP Modernization Program. However, the endeavor was widely regarded as a failure for having bought nothing more consequential than utility helicopters and gun-armed patrol vessels. This failure could be attributed both to fiscal constraints, as the Philippines weathered first the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis and then the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and the need to first decisively defeat remaining internal challengers to the state.
In 2012, history seemed to repeat itself when the Philippines was again outclassed in its own Exclusive Economic Zone, this time at Scarborough Shoal. The Aquino administration hastily passed the Revised AFP Modernization Program, yet another 15-year effort aiming to build a military capable of external defense. Unlike its original iteration, the Revised AFP Modernization Program was born under more fertile circumstances. Not only had the internal security of the Philippines improved by then, but its fiscal capabilities were likewise brighter, even logging in a budgetary surplus more than once during the Aquino administration. Moreover, succeeding incidents in the West Philippine Sea were given top billing in newsrooms all over Manila, opening the eyes of the Filipino public to the challenge China poses to the territorial integrity of the Philippines.
All three branches of the AFP immediately found a partner in South Korea. While the Philippine Army bought utilitarian trucks, the Philippine Air Force and Philippine Navy scored more substantial purchases. The Air Force bought FA-50 light fighters from Korea Aerospace Industries, the first brand new jets purchased by the country in nearly two decades, while the Navy opted for two frigates from Hyundai Heavy Industries. The ships would later be known as the Jose Rizal class.
Owing to the lack of institutional memory in procuring big-ticket defense wares, the Philippine Navy made the mistake of procuring the Jose Rizal class in a fitted-for-but-not-with manner. This meant that the ships would arrive almost barebones, and the rest of the weapons suite would be procured one after the other as the budget and political will permitted. When the lead ship, the BRP Jose Rizal, was delivered, she was armed with nothing more but a 76mm main gun and a couple of 30mm machine guns – hardly an improvement over her sisters in the fleet.
The newness of the modernization process should not be used as a scapegoat here. The Philippine Air Force did not commit this mistake in its first major procurement under the Revised AFP Modernization Program; the aforementioned FA-50 jets were procured with a full weapons and radar package, initial spares and ground support equipment, and even training simulators.
Complications hit the procurement project right out of the gate. Originally, the contract for the Jose Rizal class called for the ships to be equipped with a combat management system compatible with Link 16, the jam-resistant network used by U.S. and NATO forces that allow their ships and aircraft to share targeting data and other tactical information in real time. For this, Hyundai Heavy Industries initially planned to equip the ships with Tacticos, to be provided by the Hanwha-Thales partnership, the former being a South Korean company and the latter Dutch. However, after the partnership fizzled out, Hyundai Heavy Industries swapped the world-class Tacticos with Naval Shield, the domestic counterpart developed by Hanwha. This caused consternation on the Philippine side owing to concerns over the questionable ability of Naval Shield to tap into Link 16.
This became one of the first political scandals to hit the administration of Rodrigo Duterte. The firestorm started when a note favoring Naval Shield over Tacticos – handwritten by then-Special Assistant to the President Bong Go – was leaked to the media. A high-ranking officer of the Philippine Navy ended up being relieved of his post, and while nothing much happened on the political front for years, 2024 saw a plunder complaint filed against Bong Go, now a senator, in relation to the combat management system episode.
Over the years, Manila tried to bring the Jose Rizal class to its full warfighting capability. However, procurement of the missing weapons system went piecemeal. As of this writing, the ships are still without a close-in weapons system, which is crucial for survivability in modern warfare. While the exact dates of awarding contracts were not publicly known, the Philippine Navy announced deliveries of Mistral antiair missiles from France only in 2021, and C-Star antiship missiles from South Korea only in 2022. Both weapons, however, were designed only for point defense. The vertical launch systems and its munitions are yet to be procured. Note that these would be the most potent weapons of the ship.
With this in mind, it’s worth revisiting the chapter immediately preceding the procurement of the Jose Rizal class. Back in 2013, Italy offered a slate of military hardware to the Philippines to help jumpstart the AFP Modernization Program. The most prominent wares on offer were two Maestrale-class frigates. At the time, the talks called for a hot transfer of the ships, giving the Philippine Navy its full suite of capabilities right away.
It should be noted that the then-flagship of the Philippine Navy was the BRP Gregorio Del Pilar, a 40-year-old former U..S. Coast Guard cutter whose most potent weapon was a mere 76mm gun. The leap in capability for the Philippine Navy would have been astronomical. Not only would the Maestrale-class vessels have ushered Manila into the missile age, but their range of sensors would also give the country capabilities it has never operated before. However, talks went nowhere and Manila opted to buy brand new ships that ended up as the Jose Rizal class.
To better put the damage done by this piecemeal form of procurement into perspective, had the Philippines procured the Maestrale class all those years ago, and sans considerations about their age, the Philippine Navy would be operating a ship class more capable than the Jose Rizal class in its current form.
To its credit, the Philippines appeared to have learned its lesson. This can be seen in the procurement of the Miguel Malvar-class corvettes, still from Hyundai Heavy Industries. Whereas the Jose Rizal class arrived in a barebones condition, the Miguel Malvar class was commissioned with an almost complete weapons suite, with only the close-in weapons system yet to be procured and installed. While the more potent munitions for the VLS launchers are yet to be procured, the ability to launch is already present. There is no denying that the Malvar-class vessels were more ready for warfighting when they arrived than the Rizals were. Manila would do well to acquire munitions for the VLS as soon as possible to strengthen magazine depth.
The next big test as to whether the Philippines really learned its institutional lesson from this procurement would come when it finally signed a contract for its much-awaited multirole fighter. The signs seem promising, though. During budgetary deliberations for the 2026 defense budget, Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro admitted his preference for a complete ecosystem of air power instead of piecemeal acquisitions. In particular, he advocated for purchasing more fighters than the dozen initially planned, bumping it up to 40 fighters. Moreover, he showed his interest in acquiring not only fighters outfitted with a complete weapons suite, but even as far as aerial refueling tankers and AWACS planes.
However, challenges that can roll back this progress remain. There is the matter of the biggest corruption scandal in the history of the country, which exploded during the 2025 State of the Nation Address of President Ferdinand Marcos. Hundreds of billions of pesos have been reportedly spent on either substandard flood control projects or even completely nonexistent ones, prompting widespread protests. This has led to budgets being slashed as the General Appropriations Act is coming under increased scrutiny, making it even harder for projects with expensive capital outlays – such as major defense acquisitions – to secure funding.
It does not help that the AFP itself has found ghost projects in its own backyard. For 2026, of the 90 billion pesos allocated for modernization, only 40 billion will be programmed while 50 billion would only be provided if the government could find extra sources of income.
To say that the geopolitical tension in the South China Sea is unpredictable would probably be an understatement. As China grapples with a demographic squeeze and a slowing economy, Beijing might feel its window of opportunity closing. Add to that the growing unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy and a more hawkish Japan, and you have a more combustible mix.
The Philippines will thus need all its options available to it, the most crucial of which is a capable military. The cautionary tale of the Jose Rizal-class frigates ought to be a lasting warning to the dangers of short-sighted procurement strategies. Time buys proficiency and proficiency improves security.
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